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a state would have to provide notice and a hearing before lending
its coercive powers to a complaining landlord. At such a hearing,
the tenant will be able to contest the validity of the landlord's claim
for rent.' 2 If the Santiago rule is extended to those states, it is likely
that some will abolish the distraint remedy altogether and rely solely
on post-judgment collection proceedings to avoid bearing the administrative expense of such hearings. Tenants will benefit from
such an extention regardless of what course these states take because
their personal belongings will no longer be exposed to sale based
upon an invalid claim.

LANDLORD AND TENANT - RETALIATORY RENT INCREASE
AS AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE IN AN UNLAWFUL
DETAINER ACTION
Schweiger v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
The tenant had occupied an apartment for 4 years under a monthto-month tenancy. During this period his rent had increased from
$60 to $75 per month. The apartment became dilapidated, and pursuant to section 1941 of the California Civil Code (Code),'
which requires lessors to keep leased property in tenable condition,
the tenant requested that the landlord make repairs. The landlord
2
refused and increased the tenant's rent from $75 to $125 per month.
The average rental for a unit in the building was between $70 and
$75 per month, and no apartment in the building rented for more
than $90 per month. When a lessor fails to make requested repairs
within a reasonable time, Code section 1942' permits the lessee to
make them himself, where the cost does not exceed 1 month's rent,
and deduct the cost from his rent. The tenant repaired the delapidations, deducted the cost from his old rent of $75, and paid the
balance to the landlord. The landlord commenced an action in the
small claims court for restitution of the premises and for the balance of the increased rent. Judgment was rendered for the landlord, and the tenant appealed to the superior court for a trial de
novo, seeking to assert the defense that the retaliatory rent increase
violated public policy. The superior court ruled against the submis12 In Santiago, the court's findings indicated that at least one of the tenants had a
valid defense to the landlord's claim for rent. 319 F. Supp. at 288-90.
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sion of such a defense, but it certified the case to the court of appeals
to determine whether a tenant could defend an unlawful detainer
action on the ground that his landlord increased the rent and began
an eviction action against him because he had asserted his statutory
right to demand repairs. The court of appeals refused to transfer
the case, and the tenant applied to the Supreme Court of California
for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to hear his defense. The supreme court granted the writ and stated that if the
tenant could factually establish the retaliatory motive of his landlord
in instituting the rent increase or eviction action, such proof would
bar the tenant's eviction.
Traditionally a landlord could terminate a month-to-month tenancy at will; the tenant could not question his motive4 or attack
his reasons.' Recently, however, in Edwards v. Habib,6 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit imposed a limitation
on the traditional power of a landlord to evict. In Edwards, a landlord attempted to evict a tenant for reporting housing code violations.
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1954) provides:

The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render
it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and
twenty-nine.
Section 1929 of the Code provides: "The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his want of ordinary care."
2
See CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1161 (West Supp. 1971). The Schweiger court
stated that section 1161 implies that a landlord under a month-to-month tenancy has
the unrestricted power to raise the rent for his property to any level and to evict tenants
unable or unwilling to pay. The relevant provisions of section 1161 are as follows:
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life ...is guilty of unlawful
detainer:
2. When he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without
the permission of his landlord ...after default in the payment of rent, pur3

suant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held ....
CAL Cxv. CODE § 1942 (West 1954), as amended, (West Supp. 1971).

Section

1942 provides:
If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which
he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, where the cost of such repairs does not require an expenditure greater
than one month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he
shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other
conditions.
4
E.g., DeWolfe v. McAllister, 229 Mass. 410, 412, 118 N.E. 885, 887 (1918);
Wormwood v. Alton Bay Camp Meeting Ass'n, 87 N.H. 136, 175 A. 233 (1934).
5E.g., Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 234, 85 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1959); see
Angel v. Black Band Consol. Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 47, 122 S.E. 274 (1924).
6397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
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The court held that although the landlord could evict for any legal
reason or for no reason at all, he could not evict in retaliation for the
tenant's report of housing code violations to the authorities. The
court reasoned that to permit a landlord to evict for such a reason
would subvert the policy of the housing codes to improve substandard housing.
The conflict in Schweiger was between the unlimited power of
the landlord to raise the rent,7 and the policy to improve substandard housing underlying the statutory self-help remedies. 8 Before
Schweiger, 'California courts recognized an equitable limitation on
the powers of landlords only when the tenant's defense was constitutionally based. The Schweiger court reasoned that the failure to
recognize a reasonable limitation on the punitive power of landlords
would completely frustrate the public policy expressed in the tenant
self-help statutes. The effectiveness of statutory self-help remedies
depends entirely upon the tenant's initiative. Housing code violations like those in Edwards, however, are revealed not only by tenants reporting them, but also through independent investigation by
government housing inspectors. Therefore, it was even more compelling that the defense be permitted in Schweiger than in Edwards.
The dissent's position in Schweiger was that problems of retalitory rent increases and evictions should be left to the legislature
because it has the function of deciding important questions of public
policy. The dissent noted that the legislature had acted to provide a
statutory solution to the problems of retaliatory evictions and rent
increases through the adoption of Code section 1942.5,1" which was
7 See note 2 supra.
8
See CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954), as amended, (West Supp. 1971);
notes 1, 3 supra.
0 In Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962), the court held that a tenant defending an unlawful detainer action
was entitled to prove that he was being evicted solely because of his race and that such
proof would bar his eviction. The court seasoned that judicial enforcement of a discriminatory eviction would be state action in violation of the equal protection clause.
10
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1971). Section 1942.5 provides:
(a) If the lessor has as his dominant purpose retaliation against the
lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter
or because of his complaint to an appropriate governmental agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, and if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as
to the payment of his rent, the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding, cause the lessee to quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services, within 60 days:
(1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has given notice
pursuant to Section 1942; or
(2) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has filed a written complaint, with an appropriate governmental agency, of which the lessor
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to become effective less than 2 weeks after Schweiger was decided.
Thus, the dissent reasoned that the court should address itself to the
application of this legislation in future cases rather than create by
judicial decree a new defense to actions for unlawful detainer. The
majority, probably because the new legislation would not apply to
Mr. Schweiger's case, was not persuaded by this reasoning. The majority may, however, have been influenced by a desire to provide a
precedent that would be at least persuasive authority in other jurisdictions. 1
Schweiger is significant to landlord-tenant law for three reasons.
First, Schweiger affords a tenant protection when faced with landlord retaliation by means other than direct eviction. Second,
Schweiger extends the application of the policy to improve substanhas notice, for the purpose of obtaining correction of a condition relating to
tenantability; or
(3) After the date of an inspection or issuance of a citation, resulting
from a written complaint described in paragraph (2) of which the lessor did
not have notice; or
(4) After entry of judgment or the signing of an arbitration award, if
any, when in the judicial proceeding or arbitration the issue of tenantability
is determined adversely to the lessor.
In each instance, the 60-day period shall run from the latest applicable
date referred to in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive.
(b) A lessee may not invoke the provisions of this section more than
once in any 12-month period.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the
exercise by the lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or any law
pertaining to the hiring of property or his right to do any of the acts described
in subdivision (a) for any lawful cause. Any waiver by a lessee of his rights
under this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (c), inclusive, a lessor may recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other
acts described in subdivision (a) within the period or periods prescribed
therein if the notice of termination, rent increase, or other act, and any
pleading or statement of issues in an arbitration, if any, states the ground
upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to recover possession, increase rent,
or do any of the other acts described in subdivision (a). If such statement
be controverted, the lessor shall establish its truth at the trial or other hearing.
"lThere is a third possible explanation for the majority's disregard of section
1942.5. Section 1942.5 dearly places the burden of proving an absence of retaliatory
intent on the landlord if he tries to evict the tenant or raise the rent within 60 days after
the tenant complains about the condition of the dwelling. Under a perfectly legitimate
interpretation of that section, however, the landlord could legally evict the tenant or raise
the rent after the 60 day period for an admitted retaliatory reason. If the courts interpret section 1942.5 in this manner, it will merely provide a complaining tenant with
60 days to find a new place to live. After that time he can be openly evicted for having
exercised his statutory rights. Even though Sehweiger places the burden of proof of
retaliatory intent on the tenant, it gives a complaining tenant more protection than
section 1942.5. Under Schweiger, once a tenant proves a retaliatory motive, the landlord will be unable to evict him or raise his rent until the landlord can establish the
absence of such a motive.
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dard housing. Edwards declared this policy to be the basis of a
housing code. Schweiger extends the application of this policy
to tenant self-help statutes. Under Schweiger, a tenant is free from
landlord retailiation not only when he reports housing code violations, but also when he exercises any other statutory rights designed
to help him improve his housing. Third, Schweiger decides an issue left open in Edwards by placing the burden of proving retaliatory intent on the tenant.12
Placement of the burden of proof of retaliatory intent on the tenant is inconsistent with the public policy, relied on in Schweiger and
Edwards, to enable tenants to receive the full benefit of housing
statutes.' 3 Because the landlord is in the better position to inform
the court of the reasons for his actions, it would have been more
logical for the Schweiger court to place the burden of proving nonretaliation on the landlord. A third approach for allocating the
burden of proof places it by reference to when the alleged retaliatory
conduct takes place. For example, the Model Residential Landlord
Tenant Code prohibits rent increases and evictions within 6 months
after a tenant has requested authorized repairs or complained of
housing code violations, unless the landlord can establish a nonretaliatory motive. 4 The recently enacted California Civil Code section 1942.5 adopts this approach and establishes 2 months as the
time period for the shifting of the burden. 5
Schweiger is the logical extention of Edwards, and is necessary
to make the latter decision meaningful. Protection from retaliatory
eviction is of little value to a tenant whose rent is doubled because
he requested repairs or reported a housing code violation. The
state legislatures, however, are the proper bodies to act in this area.
That they have thus far failed to adequately recognize the plight of
the low and moderate income tenant in today's society is exemplified by the reasoning of both Schweiger and Edwards. Both courts
based their holdings on the need to avoid frustration of the policy of
12See

Dickut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (1970),

where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in allowing a defense of retaliatory eviction
under facts similar to those in Edwards, expressly placed on the tenant the burden of
proving retaliatory intent by clear and convincing evidence.
13 See Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches,
54 CALiF. L. REv. 670, 682 (1966); Note, Landlord and Tenants - Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L REV. 193, 205 (1967); Note, Retaliatiory
Eviction - Is CaliforniaLagging Behind, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 700, 705 (1967).
14 MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (1969).
15CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1971); see note 10 supra. See also
note II supra.
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existing housing legislation. Hopefully, more legislatures will begin
to realize that the common law in the landlord tenant area must be
completely replaced by legislation in order to adequately protect
tenants and make decisions like Edwards and Schweiger unnecessary.

